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INTRODUCTION 
The United States is currently expending significant effort in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan to shape each respective government and 
 
∗ Dan E. Stigall is a Trial Attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
International Affairs in Washington DC. He was formally an active duty U.S. 
Army Judge Advocate (“JAG”) from 2001-2009 and remains an officer in the U.S. 
Army Reserves. LL.M., 2009, George Washington University (International and 
Comparative Law); J.D., 2000, Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law 
Center; B.A., 1996, Louisiana State University. Any opinion expressed in this 
article is solely that of the author and not necessarily that of the U.S. Department 
of Justice or the Department of Defense. 
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transform each country into a stable democracy. This endeavor, in 
turn, has also shaped—or even transformed—the U.S. approach to 
armed conflict by forcing policymakers and military commanders to 
find solutions to the seemingly intractable problems associated with 
developing countries and their relative instability. This focus on 
reconstruction and stabilization has led to the rise of “stability 
operations”—a relatively new addition to the military lexicon.1  
Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding degraded, 
damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical 
infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation 
for long-term development. Stabilization is the process by 
which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in 
violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and 
reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for 
successful long-term development. Together, reconstruction 
and stabilization comprise the broad range of activities 
defined by the Department of Defense as stability operations.2 
The Department of Defense (“DoD”) defines “stability operations” 
as military missions, tasks, or activities conducted in foreign 
countries and in coordination with other instruments of national 
power “to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and 
provide essential government services,” reconstruct emergency 
infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian relief.3 Concomitant with the 
ascendance of the concept of stability operations has been an 
increase in calls from key lawmakers for “a well-organized and 
strongly led civilian counterpart to the military in post-conflict 
 
 1. See Vasilios Tasikas, Developing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Need 
for a New Strategic Paradigm, ARMY LAW., July 2007, at 45. 
The doctrine of stability operations is a new peculiarity in military literature 
typically described in a fashion that at first blush appears to be miscellaneous 
to the traditional function of the military. The term, in and of itself, connotes 
military operations which are ‘not war’ and missions seemingly best left to 
civilian agencies to execute. 
Id. at 50. See generally Dan E. Stigall, Comparative Law and State-Building: The 
“Organic Minimalist” Approach to Legal Reconstruction, 29 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 1 (2007) (discussing state-building and legal reconstruction). 
 2. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-07: STABILITY OPERATIONS ¶ 
1-56 (2008). 
 3. U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0: JOINT OPERATIONS 
V-1 (2008). 
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zones.”4 There are numerous reasons to welcome civilian 
involvement in stability operations. Civilians can offer a degree of 
expertise in certain technical fields that the military might lack.5 
Likewise, civilians may sometimes be perceived as less threatening 
to the developing state and its citizenry. Neither of these reasons, 
however, holds out as an immutable truth, nor can it be said that 
military personnel fundamentally lack what civilian personnel may 
provide.  
Moreover, as recent years have demonstrated, stability and 
reconstruction operations are not confined to peaceful areas of the 
world. To the contrary, such work is often undertaken in areas of 
persistent conflict, where reconstruction is taking place amidst the 
bombing and large-scale destruction wrought by military activity.6 It 
is perhaps the most apparent paradox of modern warfare that this 
seemingly dissonant combination of simultaneous reconstruction and 
destruction is, in fact, the confluence of forces toward a common 
goal: to eliminate those “who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, 
security, or economic interests.”7   
 
 4. See Senator Richard Lugar, Address at the National Defense University 
(Mar. 23, 2006), available at http://lugar.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=253067 
&& (suggesting that the Secretary of State could lead the civilian-side operation to 
promote inter-agency cooperation and knowledge). 
 5. See Michèle Flournoy, Training and Education for Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction, in WINNING THE PEACE: AN AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR POST-
CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 126, 131 (Robert C. Orr ed., 2004) (arguing that the 
U.S. military’s civilian-run divisions give the United States the greatest capacity to 
assist in post-conflict operations ). 
 6. See H.R. COMM. ON ARMED SERV. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & 
INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., DEPLOYING FEDERAL CIVILIANS TO THE 
BATTLEFIELD: INCENTIVES, BENEFITS, AND MEDICAL CARE 10 (Comm. Print 
2008). 
Over the course of more than seven years of war, nearly 10,000 federal 
civilian employees have been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan to support 
security, political, and economic development. While certainly unique in scale 
and complexity, the stability and reconstruction missions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are also unprecedented in their risk to our deployed citizens. 
Some claim these posts are exposed to such a high level of threat that most 
civilian personnel would have been evacuated from them in the pre-9/11 era. 
There are few safe places in countries where terrorists, militia, insurgents, and 
criminals are seeking power and attempting to undermine efforts to establish 
legitimate governments. 
Id. 
 7. National Security Presidential Directive 44 on Management of Interagency 
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The result of this shift in the paradigm of armed conflict has been 
the creation of a grey zone of activities that are neither clearly 
civilian nor military in nature. What is now called “stability 
operations” is a hybrid area that fuses a core military mission with a 
field of knowledge and experience that is dominated, at least in 
theory, by civilians. Often the relevant experience for the successful 
conduct of stability operations is shared between civilians and 
military. Even when the relevant expertise is civilian in nature, it is 
generally the military that must provide the security and logistical 
capabilities to enable the operation.8 As a result, strategic parlance is 
now characterized by references to “integrated civil-military 
planning teams that establish mechanisms for rapid response.”9 
Civilians and military personnel now, as never before, find 
themselves intertwined in a new grey zone that does not fully belong 
to either of them.  
But there are legal ramifications for the civilians who operate 
within this grey zone. Importantly, there is yet another grey area 
surrounding the question of what conduct disqualifies a civilian from 
the protections and immunity traditionally given to civilians during 
armed conflict. The resultant lack of clarity can translate into 
significant legal consequences—both for civilians who are mobilized 
pursuant to such an effort and for U.S. policymakers who seek to 
criminalize the conduct of terrorists and insurgents.  
This article explores the phenomenon of U.S. government civilians 
who engage in stability and reconstruction operations in conflict 
zones and their legal status under the law of armed conflict, paying 
specific attention to the corps of federal civilians being developed for 
this specific purpose: the Civilian Response Corps. The discussion 
herein reveals that the field of stability operations is a hybrid area 
 
Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, Office of the Press Sec’y 
(Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter NSPD 44], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ 
nspd/nspd-44.html. 
 8. See Jackie Northam, ‘Civilian Surge’ Plan for Afghanistan Hits a Snag 
(NPR radio broadcast Sept. 20, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=112976965 (questioning whether the military succeeds in 
its task to secure an area and allow the civilian experts to move around the country 
freely). 
 9. Int’l Sec. Assistance Force [ISAF], COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, at 2-21 
(Aug. 30, 2009), available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/ 
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf [hereinafter ISAF]. 
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that requires both civilian and military resources to attain a common 
objective—a fact that conflates the purposes and goals of both, and 
necessarily colors the civilians engaging in such work with a military 
tint. This hue of belligerence can translate into serious liability when 
considering the rather elastic approach some elements of the U.S. 
government have taken when determining which activity deprives 
civilians of their protections under international law. Ultimately, this 
article posits that the complex nature of civilian operations is such 
that neither the military nor civilians can be extricated from it. 
Accordingly, U.S. interests are best served by articulating a single, 
formal, and more restrictive interpretation of what it means to 
“directly participate in hostilities.” 
I. THE RULES ON TARGETING CIVILIANS 
As Professor Yoram Dinstein notes, there are fundamental 
distinctions between civilians and combatants under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict.10 This distinction, first formally 
articulated in the St. Petersburg Convention, is a “norm of customary 
international law applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts.”11 The International Court of Justice 
has noted that this principle, known as the principle of distinction, is 
one of the “cardinal principles” of the law of international armed 
conflict.12 
International treaties also reflect this basic proposition. Article 
51(3) of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
 
 10. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 27 (2004) (defining combatants as “[m]embers 
of the armed forces of a belligerent Party (except medical and religious personnel . 
. . ), even if their specific task is not linked to active hostilities” and “[a]ny other 
persons who take an active part in the hostilities”). 
 11. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. 
OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
VOLUME I: RULES 3 (2005) (emphasizing the importance of weakening enemy 
forces during war instead of targeting the civilian population). 
 12. Id. at 5; see also JOSEPH S. NYE, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND HISTORY 25 (5th ed. 2005) (“The 
prohibition against intentionally killing people who pose no harm also helps to 
identify why terrorism is wrong. Some skeptics argue that ‘one man’s terrorist is 
just another man’s freedom fighter.’ But under just war doctrine, you can fight for 
freedom, but you cannot target innocent civilians.”). 
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(“Protocol I”) states that civilians enjoy immunity from attack during 
international armed conflict “unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities.”13 Such language reflects the general rule 
that combatants are allowed to attack other combatants and military 
targets but are prohibited from targeting civilians. The underlying 
rationale behind this distinction is to “ensure . . . that international 
armed conflicts be waged solely among the combatants of the 
belligerent Parties.”14 The operative legal framework for armed 
conflict, therefore, allows a degree of protection to civilians—but 
that protection is not absolute. To the contrary, it is tied to the 
requirement that civilians abstain from active participation in 
hostilities.15  
As noted, such protection applies similarly in non-international 
armed conflict, as well as the concomitant caveats. For instance, the 
protections of Common Article 3 to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions apply only to “persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities.”16 Likewise, Article 13(3) of 1977 Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-international Armed Conflicts (“Protocol II”) deprives civilians 
who participate in hostilities of both the general protection against 
the dangers arising from military operations and immunity from 
attack.17 The loss of such protections is significant because these 
individuals can then be lethally targeted (i.e., killed), are not entitled 
to POW status upon capture, and “may be tried by an opposing 
 
 13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 
art. 51.3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 14. DINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 27. 
 15. See id. 
Lawful combatants can attack enemy combatants or military objectives, 
causing death, injury and destruction. In contrast, civilians are not allowed to 
participate actively in the fighting: if they do, they lose their status as 
civilians. But as long as they retain that status, civilians ‘enjoy general 
protection against dangers arising from military operations.’ 
Id. 
 16. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva 
Convention] (applying by its terms to “armed conflict not of an international 
character”). 
 17. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II) arts. 13.1, 13.3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
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force’s judicial system for actions taken while directly participating 
in hostilities.”18 
Violation of the prohibition on targeting civilians has been made 
punishable by international bodies such as the International Criminal 
Court, which criminalizes “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against 
the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not 
taking direct part in hostilities.”19 Similarly, such acts have been 
made punishable by the Military Commissions set up by the United 
States in the wake of September 11. The Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 imposes criminal liability on any person subject to its 
provisions who “intentionally engages in an attack upon a civilian 
population as such, or individual civilians not taking active part in 
hostilities.”20 In the event that a targeted civilian is killed, Military 
Commissions can even subject the accused to the death penalty.21 
There is widespread agreement that violators of this international 
norm should be prosecuted (at least in some forum) and multiple 
mechanisms have been created in which to do so. 
It must be noted that there are multiple disagreements surrounding 
various aspects of Article 51(3) of Protocol I and its requirements. 
Chiefly, there is great dispute regarding the temporal scope of the 
loss of protection—the question of the duration of the loss of 
protection once the activity in question is undertaken.22 More 
expansive readings of this temporal requirement have been criticized 
 
 18. See Eric Robert Christensen, The Dilemma of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, 19 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript 
at 11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1398462 
(analyzing current interpretations of the phrase “direct participation in hostilities,” 
and asserting that a given entity’s chosen interpretation is driven by self-interest). 
 19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(i), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
 20. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. § 950t (2) (West 2009). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Eric T. Jensen, U.S. Army JAG Corps, Targeting of Persons and 
Property, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY 
PERSPECTIVE 37, 48 (Michael W. Lewis ed., 2009). 
On one end of the spectrum is the civilian who directly participates one time 
and then ceases his participation. Is he targetable until the end of hostilities? 
On the other end of the spectrum is the civilian by day and guerilla by night 
who carries out a continuous pattern of hostile acts against his foes. Is he only 
targetable while conducting the actual nighttime raid? 
Id. 
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as providing “light switch” protection or “revolving door” protection 
to terrorists or insurgents and have, quite understandably, been the 
source of much criticism and objection.23 The focus of this article, 
however, is on a much more basic question in the “direct 
participation” analysis. Rather than explore the length of time during 
which protections are lost, this article focuses on what types of 
activities trigger the loss of protections in the first place.  
It is widely acknowledged that the activities in question must have 
at least three basic elements: the activity must be harmful to a party 
to the conflict, there must be a direct link between the action and the 
harm, and there must be a “belligerent nexus” such that the act 
supports a party to the conflict to the detriment of another.24 As far as 
which acts serve to throw off the mantle of protection described 
above, Articles 4(A)(4) and (5) of the Third Geneva Convention 
provide an illustrative list of activities that are not considered to be 
direct participation. Those are as follows: 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without 
actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of 
military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply 
contractors, members of labour units or of services 
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that 
they have received authorization, from the armed forces 
which they accompany, who shall provide them for that 
purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.  
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and 
apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil 
aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by 
more favourable treatment under any other provisions of 
international law.25 
 
 23. See id. at 49 (raising the issue of whether certain groups of individuals may 
be considered constantly involved in hostilities, such as those who take part in 
hostilities intermittently); see also Michael N. Schmitt, War, International Law, 
and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New Century: 
Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors 
or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 535 (2005) (illustrating this debate 
with “the image of the civilian who is a guerilla by night and a farmer by day”). 
 24. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 47 (arguing that while these criteria are 
standard and generally accepted, there is much debate over the practical 
application of these factors). 
 25. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 16, arts. 4A(4)-(5). 
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But aside from that expressly proscribed area, there is little 
guidance or agreement on what other sorts of activities would (or 
would not) divest a civilian of the protections offered by 
international law. As such, the extent to which civilian participation 
in hostilities results in the negation of their protected status is not 
easy to discern. As the International Committee for the Red Cross 
(“ICRC”) study on customary international humanitarian law flatly 
notes, “A precise definition of the term ‘direct participation in 
hostilities’ does not exist.”26 Likewise, other scholars have 
commented on the pronounced difficulty in defining the extent and 
limits of “direct participation in hostilities.”27 Dinstein explains:  
It is not always easy to define what active participation in 
hostilities denotes. Usually, the reference is to “direct” 
participation in hostilities. However, the adjective “direct” 
does not shed much light on the extent of participation 
required. For instance, a driver delivering ammunition to 
combatants and a person who gathers military intelligence in 
enemy-controlled territory are commonly acknowledged to be 
actively taking part in hostilities. There is a disparity between 
the latter and a civilian who retrieves intelligence data from 
satellites or listening posts, working in terminals located in 
his home country. Needless to say, perhaps, a mere 
contribution to the general war effort (e.g., by supplying 
foodstuffs to combatants) is not tantamount to active 
participation in hostilities.28  
There is, therefore, little agreement on anything except the fact 
that the definition is an unsettled area of international law.29 This 
state of affairs has led to a degree of latitude in interpretation. But 
latitude in interpretation is often coterminous with legal 
indeterminacy. Further, as one scholar has noted, “The more 
confused a concept, the more it lends itself to opportunistic 
 
 26. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 11, at 22. 
 27. See Schmitt, supra note 23, at 533 (positing that the definition of “direct 
participation in hostilities” seems require “but for” causation, as well as some 
knowledge on the civilian’s part that the action would cause harm). 
 28. DINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 27-28. 
 29. See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 
A.F. L. REV. 1, 28 (2001) (emphasizing that common belief does not limit “direct 
part” to actual fighting, but can also include harm to personnel or equipment). 
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appropriation.”30 Accordingly, and quite predictably, international 
actors with varying agendas and equities have articulated 
significantly different interpretive views of what it means to directly 
participate in hostilities. These views can be roughly separated into 
two schools of thought existing at polar ends of a conceptual 
continuum: (1) a restrictive view that seeks to limit the range of 
activity by which a civilian loses legal protections, and (2) an 
expansive view that seeks to permit the targeting of a wider range of 
civilians. 
A. THE RESTRICTIVE VIEW 
The more restrictive approach to interpreting Article 51(3) and the 
meaning of “direct participation” posits that the only acts by civilians 
which qualify as direct participation in hostilities are those that 
“cause ‘actual harm’ to personnel and equipment where there is a 
‘direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the 
harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where the activity 
occurs.’”31 Urging such a restrictive position, the ICRC has proposed 
that the definition of direct participation be limited to civilians who 
“carry out acts, which aim to support one party to the conflict by 
directly causing harm to another party, either directly inflicting 
death, injury or destruction, or by directly harming the enemy’s 
military operations or capacity.”32 Professor Michael N. Schmitt, in 
noting the high threshold for an act to qualify as “direct 
participation,” has posited that this approach implies a direct link 
between the activity in question and its immediate consequences, and 
that “[p]erhaps the best tack when analyzing a particular act is 
assessing the criticality of the act to the direct application of violence 
against the enemy.”33 Even so, it is important to note that not all 
 
 30. BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2006). 
 31. Douglas W. Moore, Twenty-First Century Embedded Journalists: Lawful 
Targets?, ARMY LAW., July 2009, at 1, 20 (quoting CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., 
COMMENTARY OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 516 (Yves Sandoz et al eds., 1987)). 
 32. ICRC, Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions and Answers, Feb. 6, 
2009, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-
participation-ihl-faq-020609. 
 33. Schmitt, supra note 23, at 534 (contrasting activities such as the 
“provi[sion] of strategic analysis” with others such as the “creation, analysis, and 
dissemination of tactical intelligence” for particular military targets, and 
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activities in question must be related to the application of deadly 
force against the enemy. In fact, Professor Schmitt has argued that 
using a “kill chain” as an analytic tool for determining “direct 
participation” is too restrictive because “not all military operations 
seek to weaken the enemy in this fashion.”34 
B. THE EXPANSIVE VIEW  
The expansive view of “direct participation in hostilities” would 
permit a broader range of civilians to be legitimately targeted based 
on a wider range of activity. Although there is not yet a fully 
coherent U.S. position on the matter, it is clear that the United 
States—which is not a party to Protocol I35—takes a broader view of 
“direct participation” and, therefore, extends the range of civilians 
who may be lawfully targeted. As one U.S. Navy Judge Advocate 
(“JAG”) has noted, “The United States interprets ‘direct 
part[icipation]’ more broadly than the Additional Protocol I 
signatories, and does so through the prism of self-defense.”36 The 
U.S. DoD Law of War Working Group has opined that U.S. civilians 
may divest themselves of their immunity from intentional attack “if 
there is: ‘(1) geographic proximity of service provided to units in 
contact with the enemy, (2) proximity of relationship between 
services provided and harm resulting to enemy, and (3) temporal 
relation of support to enemy contact or harm resulting to enemy.’”37 
That same group has chosen “active part[icipation]” as their 
preferred term to describe the point at which a civilian becomes at 
 
suggesting that the former should not be considered critical to efforts in the same 
way as the latter) . 
 34. Id. at 533 n.89. 
 35. See ICRC, Additional Protocol I Ratifications, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf 
/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited May 31, 2010) (listing States 
Parties to Protocol I); see also Michael J. Matheson, Opening Remarks at the Sixth 
Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on 
International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law 
and The 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 415, 420 (1987) (noting that certain portions of Protocol I are 
considered by the U.S. to reflect customary international law). 
 36. Albert S. Janin, Engaging Civilian-Belligerents Leads to Self-
Defense/Protocol I Marriage, ARMY LAW., July 2007, at 82, 89. 
 37. Id. at 89 (quoting INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, & OPERATIONAL LAW 
VOL. II I-10 (2006)). 
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risk from intentional attack, and has defined “active” participation as 
“[e]ntering the theatre of operations in support or operation of 
sensitive, high value equipment, such as a weapon system.”38 Such a 
view, while fairly constrained, is still broader than the ICRC’s 
position that the civilian must be directly causing harm (death, 
injury, or destruction) to another party or “directly harming the 
enemy’s military operations or capacity.”39  
Still, certain elements of the U.S. military have advocated for an 
even more expansive “functionality test,” which does not turn on 
whether actual harm resulted from the civilian action in question and 
does not measure geographic or temporal distance from the conflict. 
Instead, the “functionality test” assesses the validity of the civilian 
target “based upon the importance and level of functions carried out 
by civilians on the battlefield.”40 Accordingly, “[t]aking part in 
hostilities . . . is not regarded as limited to civilians who engage in 
actual fighting,”41 and certain mission-essential civilians working on 
a military base during an international armed conflict could be 
subject to direct attack.42 Likewise, pursuant to such a view, a 
“civilian entering the theater of operations in support or operation of 
sensitive, high Value [sic] equipment, such as a weapon system” has 
directly participated in hostilities and has lost his or her protection.43 
A U.S. Army JAG has even opined that “[t]his permissive theory 
makes it conceivable that journalists who are in direct support of 
modern military operations could lose their immunity like other 
civilians accompanying the force.”44 Lisa L. Turner and Lynn G. 
Norton noted the creeping prominence of this view:  
 
 38. INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S 
LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 143 (Keith E. Puls ed., 2004), 
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law-war-handbook-
2004.pdf. 
 39. ICRC, supra note 32. 
 40. See Moore, supra note 31, at 21 (expanding the definition of belligerents to 
include civilians who “direct[ly] support” enemy hostile operations). 
 41. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DA CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE DEPLOYMENT GUIDE 6 
(1995), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/p690_47.pdf. 
 42. Turner & Norton, supra note 29, at 31. 
 43. Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Special Ass’t for Law of War Matters, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Regarding the Law of War Status of Civilians 
Accompanying Military Forces in the Field, § 3(a) (May 6, 1999) (on file with The 
American University International Law Review) [hereinafter Parks Memo]. 
 44. See Moore, supra note 31, at 21 (detailing just how broad the U.S.’s 
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The Judge Advocate General School of the Army recently 
adopted this view teaching “the contract technical advisor 
that spends each day working with members of an armed 
force to make a weapon system more effective . . . is 
integrated with [the] force, [and taking an] active role in 
hostilities, [and therefore] may be targeted.”45  
Such a view seems to have found a role in Afghanistan, where 
reports indicate that certain drug traffickers with ties to the 
insurgency are now being targeted in the same manner as 
combatants. A recent report by the Congressional Research Institute 
notes that the United States is interpreting international law in such a 
way as to allow military commanders “to put drug traffickers with 
proven links to the insurgency on a kill list, called the joint integrated 
prioritized target list.”46 Such a broad interpretation of “direct 
participation in hostilities” practically equates facilitation of the 
military effort (in this case financing) with direct participation. 
Although this issue will be addressed in detail below, it is worth 
noting here that a legal analysis equating mere financing of an 
insurgency or war effort with “direct participation” is problematic on 
a number of levels. Emphasizing the complexity of this issue and the 
problems with so broad an interpretation are recent reports that 
NGOs working in Afghanistan, as well as certain U.S. contractors, 
have been paying mafia-style protection money to Taliban and tribal 
warlords.47 Although such conduct obviously merits punishment, it 
 
“functionality test” might be). 
 45. Turner & Norton, supra note 29, at 31 (quoting Protecting Human Rights 
During Military Operations, 48TH GRADUATE COURSE DESKBOOK 15-3 (Int’l & 
Operational L. Dep’t, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, 
2000)); see also Jensen, supra note 22, at 55 (implying that this view also applies 
to non-international armed conflicts, during which “government forces routinely 
treat[] organized opposition groups as much like an ‘enemy’ as they would the 
armed forces of opposing States during international armed conflicts”). 
 46. See CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RES. SERV., AFGHANISTAN: 
NARCOTICS AND U.S. POLICY 16 (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf (“The military places no restrictions 
on the use of force with these selected targets, which means they can be killed or 
captured on the battlefield.”). 
 47. See Congress to Probe Private Military Contractors in Afghanistan, 
CNN.COM, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/12/17/ 
afghanistan.contractors.probe/index.html (questioning whether parts of a nearly 
$2.2 billion contract in Afghanistan were diverted to pay local warlords and the 
Taliban “for security”); William Dowell, Analysis: Rising Threat to Aid Agencies 
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would seem rather extreme to argue that such persons are no longer 
protected civilians and could, therefore, be attacked with impunity.  
Nonetheless, in the end, there remains a divergence of conflicting 
and competing opinions as to what “direct participation” entails. The 
concept remains fluid and open to interpretation. As such, whether a 
civilian becomes a lawful target based on certain activity is subject to 
debate and will depend upon both the facts of the individual case and 
the analytical framework chosen. Whatever the case, it is apparent 
that use of the functionality analysis represents an extremely broad 
view and permits the targeting of civilians for a much broader range 
of activity than that permitted under Protocol I. 
II. STABILITY OPERATIONS AND CIVILIAN 
PRIMACY 
The reconstruction seen taking place amidst such large-scale 
destruction in modern conflicts is not the only paradox associated 
with stability operations. Another is the fact that civilian agencies are 
ostensibly at the helm of stability operations—even though such 
operations are now considered a “core U.S. military mission.”48 On 
December 7, 2005, President George W. Bush issued National 
Security Presidential Directive 44 (“NSPD 44”), which was designed 
“to promote the security of the United States through improved 
coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and 
stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or 
in transition from conflict or civil strife.”49 This directive signaled the 
official recognition that failed or failing states posed a threat to U.S. 
 
in Afghanistan, GLOBAL POST, Sept. 18, 2009, 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/worldview/090916/rising-threat-aid-agencies-
afghanistan (discussing investigations into payments by international contractors to 
the Taliban, via Afghan subcontractors, in exchange for guarantees of safety in 
Taliban-controlled regions); Justin Huggler, Afghan Candidate Calls for Expulsion 
of ‘Corrupt’ NGOs, EZILON INFOBASE, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.ezilon.com/info 
rmation/article_9624.shtml (quoting an Afghan political candidate's allegations 
that "[a]bout 20 per cent of all the funding to NGOs is spent on ‘commissions’ 
which are bribes to government officials to win contracts"). 
 48. U.S DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.05: MILITARY SUPPORT FOR 
STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION, AND RECONSTRUCTION (SSTR) OPERATIONS ¶ 
4.1 (2005) [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.05], available at 
http://faculty.nps.edu/dl/HFN/documents/DoD_Directive_d300005p.pdf. 
 49. NSPD 44, supra note 7. 
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national security interests—a threat that U.S. government agencies 
would need to mitigate or counter. The directive declares that: 
The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the 
capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries 
or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from 
conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable 
path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market 
economies. The United States should work with other 
countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it 
whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when 
necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, 
development, democratic practices, market economies, and 
the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments 
abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and 
to prevent those territories from being used as a base of 
operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized 
crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign 
policy, security, or economic interests.50  
A notable aspect of this effort, designed to prevent “territories 
from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, 
terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to 
U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests[,]”51 was the 
recognition that civilians would play the lead role in such efforts. 
NSPD 44 expressly states, “[t]he Secretary of State shall coordinate 
and lead integrated United States Government efforts . . . to prepare, 
plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”52 
Accordingly, the Department of State—a civilian agency—is 
theoretically in the lead role for such initiatives.53  
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. (assigning primary responsibility for carrying out NSPD 44 to the 
Department of State, and proclaiming that efforts shall be coordinated with the 
Secretary of Defense “to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. 
military operations across the spectrum of conflict”). But see Richard Weitz, 
Obstacles to a Successful Civilian Surge in Afghanistan, CENT. ASIA-CAUCASUS 
INST. ANALYST, Apr. 8, 2009, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5077 
(suggesting that the Obama administration and its NATO allies will struggle to 
staff a civilian “surge” in Afghanistan because “the State Department is seeking to 
hire only a few hundred more development experts for Afghanistan,” leaving the 
U.S. military to make up the shortfall with tens of thousands more troops on the 
ground). 
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Military doctrine, as one might expect, conforms to NSPD 44 and 
reflects the primacy of civilian leadership in stability operations. As 
one U.S. Army Field Manual notes, “[t]he Department of State is 
charged with leading and coordinating U.S. Government efforts to 
conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations.”54 Nonetheless, 
in spite of the civilian lead, stability operations have been made a 
central part of the modern military’s functional competence. The 
U.S. military has historically performed such operations with 
regularity,55 but in recent years, the ascendance of stability operations 
has been both revolutionary and rapid. In November 2005, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense issued DoD Directive 3000.05, entitled 
“Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.”56 The directive expressly 
declares that “[s]tability operations are a core U.S. military mission 
that the [military] shall be prepared to conduct and support.”57 That 
same directive notes that, during times of armed conflict, stability 
operations “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations 
and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD 
activities.”58 For purposes of the U.S. military, stability operations 
are consequently “on par with combat operations.”59 
But the role of civilian leadership is not limited to backseat 
coordination from the comfort of a federal office building. U.S. 
government civilians are actually putting their boots (or loafers) on 
the ground in areas of persistent conflict and conducting the difficult, 
hands-on work of stability operations.60 This civilian involvement 
 
 54. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 1-04: LEGAL SUPPORT TO THE 
OPERATIONAL ARMY app. D ¶ D-7 (2009). 
 55. See Tasikas, supra note 1, at 49 ("Since the early 1990’s, the United States 
has been involved in seven post-conflict stability operations—roughly one nation-
building mission every two years.”). 
 56. DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.05, supra note 48. 
 57. Id. ¶ 4.1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Timothy Austin Furin, Legally Funding Military Support to Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Re-construction Operations, ARMY LAW., Oct. 2008, at 
1, 1 (detailing how the DoD “elevated stability operations to a core military 
mission” as part of a response to strong public criticism of early stabilization 
efforts in Iraq). 
 60. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/iz/c21830.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) 
[hereinafter U.S. DoS PRTs]. 
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has assumed numerous forms, such as the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (“PRTs”) in Iraq and Afghanistan,61 and has led to the 
repurposing of more agency-specific initiatives, including the use of 
the Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
Development, Assistance, and Training (“OPDAT”) 62 and other 
Department of Justice personnel in those same theatres of 
operation.63 Likewise, myriad other federal agencies are contributing 
personnel to operations overseas in which the U.S. government is 
waging stability.64  
Most notably, civilian participation in stability operations is 
evolving into a more coherent and organized force. In addition to its 
other effects, NSPD 44 created the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization (“S/CRS”). S/CRS’s core mission 
 
The front-line operatives in the campaign to stabilize Iraq are the American 
and Coalition members who comprise the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 
or PRTs. These are relatively small operational units comprised not just of 
diplomats, but military officers, development policy experts (from the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, and 
the Department of Justice), and other specialists (in fields such as rule of law, 
engineering, and oil industry operations) who work closely with Iraqi 
provincial leaders and the Iraqi communities that they serve. While PRTs 
dispense money for reconstruction projects, the strategic purpose of these 
civil-military field teams is both political and economic. By building 
provincial governments' ability to deliver essential services and other key 
development projects to local Iraqis, PRTs help to extend the reach of the 
Iraqi government to all corners of the country and help build the stability 
necessary to complete the transition to full-Iraqi control. 
Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International 
Criminal Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1005 (2007) (remarking that OPDAT 
focuses on providing assistance to other states as a means to engender “foreign 
cooperation” with U.S. efforts to combat various threats). 
 63. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Sends 25 
Advisors to Iraq in Support of Provisional Authority Effort to Reconstruct 
Criminal System (May 20, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003 
/May/03_ag_267.htm (announcing the deployment of civilian lawyers, judges, and 
court administrators to Iraq to assist with restoration of law and order). 
 64. See U.S. DoS PRTs, supra note 60 (listing other government agencies that 
conduct reconstruction efforts in Iraq, such as the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the Department of Agriculture); see also KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES 
THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN 
AMERICAN LAW 180-81 (2009) (discussing the “blurring of military and criminal 
justice efforts” post-9/11, in that military technology was increasingly used to 
respond to domestic crime). 
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“is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian 
capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help 
stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil 
strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy 
and a market economy.”65 To accomplish this mission, S/CRS has 
begun assembling the U.S. Civilian Reserve Corps (“CRC”)—a 
corps of civilians who will rapidly be deployed overseas in order to 
respond to “critical international crises.”66 This civilian “corps,” 
which is designed to work closely with the military,67 will be 
comprised of civilian experts who will be able to assist with projects 
involving engineering, public administration, economics, and the rule 
of law. The CRC is designed to perform its function in post-conflict 
situations, as well as in areas of persistent conflict.68 Like the 
military, the CRC will possess both active and reserve branches.69 
  Though the CRC had broad bipartisan support, Congress 
delayed funding the initiative until 2008, when the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Iraq and Afghanistan (PL 110-252) allotted a 
mere $55 million for the program.70 For the 2010 fiscal year, the 
House of Representatives passed the State, Foreign Operations, and 
 
 65. U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction & 
Stabilization, http://www.state.gov/s/crs/about/index.htm (last visited May 31, 
2010). 
 66. See Melanne A. Civic, U.S. Dep’t of State, A U.S. Government 
Coordinated Civilian Stabilization Initiative, http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Stab_Ops/ 
Civic%2017%20Apr.pdf (reviewing the expectations of the NSPD 44 and 
explaining how the creation of the CRC will assist in meeting those expectations). 
 67. See id. (stating that the CRC is intended to “work with U.S. military” to 
help create stability). 
 68. Cf. id. (noting that the State Department’s pilot team of civilian responders 
has “deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan/Darfur, Chad, Nepal, Liberia, Lebanon, 
and Kosovo”). 
 69. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Civilian Response Operations (July 15, 2008), 
http://www.state.gov/s/crs/107027.htm (describing the active component as 
comprised of full-time, direct-hire employees of the State Department, and the 
standby component as comprised of federal employees who “maintain their current 
position but can be called to deploy . . . to unconventional, challenging 
environments”). 
 70. See SCOTT CARLSON & MICHAEL DZIEDZIC, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, 
RECRUITMENT OF RULE OF LAW SPECIALISTS FOR THE CIVILIAN RESPONSE CORPS 2 
(2009), available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/USIP_0109_2.PDF 
(outlining the creation of the S/CRS, which was intended to address a need for rule 
of law development specialists by providing funding to civilian-military 
initiatives). 
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Related Programs appropriations bill,71 which includes $125 million 
for the program72—a significant increase that is, in all likelihood, 
indicative of the increasing popularity of the program.73 
  What is important to note about the CRC is that its mission is 
not purely humanitarian in nature. To the contrary, the mission of the 
CRC is indissolubly bound to U.S. national security, which is 
apparent not only in the method of its inception (through a National 
Security Presidential Directive) and in its sources of funding 
(through bills passed for “war funding”),74 but also in the sort of 
training its members receive. CRC training includes a course at a 
U.S. Marine base, which covers “weapons familiarization,” “hostage 
survival,” “mission planning,” “land navigation,” and “high-
threat . . . road driving techniques.”75  
Comments from the CRC’s leadership also evidence the Corps’ 
concern for national security. For instance, Ambassador John Herbst, 
coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in comments 
delivered to students at the Command and General Staff College at 
Fort Leavenworth, recently noted that “[the CRC’s] ability to 
respond to countries in chaos is an essential part of protecting the 
United States.”76 Citing threats to global security posed by 
 
 71. H.R. 3081, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 72. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-187, at 6 (2009) (stipulating that the funds be used 
“[f]or necessary expenses to establish, support, maintain, mobilize, and deploy a 
civilian response corps”). 
 73. See Robin Wright, Civilian Response Corps Gains Ground, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 15, 2008, at A19 (noting the increase in funding reflects the government’s 
goal “to avoid repeating the disastrous U.S. experience in [reconstruction and 
stabilization] during the early days” in Iraq). 
 74. See, e.g., Friends Comm. on Nat’l Leg. [FCNL], War Bill Includes Money 
for Civilian Peacebuilders (July 10, 2008), http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php? 
item_id=3375&issue_id=130 (advocating for the Civilian Response Corps as a 
way for the U.S. to prevent and resolve violent conflict around the world by 
increasing the capability of the US to re-build during the peace process). 
 75. See Eythan Sontag, Summertime SNOE: Fieldcraft Training for the 
Civilian Response Corps, DIPNOTE: U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICIAL BLOG, Aug. 31, 
2009, 
http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/entries/fieldcraft_training_civilian_response_corps
/ (describing the State Department’s training program as “atypical” but intended to 
train civilians to effectively and safely work in the “unconventional and austere 
environments” where CRC employees are deployed). 
 76. Will King, Ambassador Discusses Role of Civilian Response Corps, FORT 
LEAVENWORTH LAMP, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/articles 
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international terrorism, narco-terrorists, piracy, and the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction to demonstrate the need for an entity 
like the CRC, the Ambassador further noted that, “[t]oday, an 
ungoverned space thousands of miles away can represent a national 
security challenge to the United States.”77 As the CRC’s website 
states, “[i]f U.S. national security interests are at stake, we must be 
prepared to respond quickly with the right civilian experts.”78 The 
CRC is, therefore, properly viewed as a U.S. national security 
instrument. 
III. THE STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN RESPONSE 
CORPS  
Under a normal interpretation of the law of armed conflict, the 
CRC’s members are immune from attack and cannot be made lawful 
targets. As such, any attack on a member of the CRC would 
constitute an international crime punishable under any of the 
international justice mechanisms designed to regulate such conduct. 
As previously discussed, however, a civilian who engages in certain 
behavior loses immunity from attack, thus rendering the targeting of 
the civilian legitimate and defensible. Given the noted lack of 
determinacy in the definition of “direct participation in hostilities,” 
the status of members of the CRC will depend on the actions 
undertaken by this nascent entity, and on the analytical framework 
used to evaluate those actions. 
A. STATUS OF THE CRC UNDER THE RESTRICTIVE VIEW 
Under the more restrictive view of “direct participation,” the 
activities of the CRC are evaluated to determine if they cause “actual 
harm” to personnel and equipment and if “there is a ‘direct causal 
relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the 
enemy at the time and the place where the activity occurs.’”79 The 
 
/2009/09/10/news/news3.txt. 
 77. Id. 
 78. U.S. Dep’t of State, Introduction to the Civilian Response Corps, 
http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4QRB 
(last visited May 31, 2010). 
 79. See Moore, supra note 31, at 20 (quoting Parks Memo, supra note 43). 
Moore asserts that this approach does the most to protect civilians accompanying 
armed forces from being lawfully and intentionally targeted by the enemy. 
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range of activities that the CRC will undertake is strikingly broad. 
The Corps currently lists five “core organizational functions:”80 
conflict prevention, planning, civilian response operations, strategic 
communication, and resource management.81 Each of these 
categories is broad enough to encompass a vast swath of activities, 
all of which are geared toward building and maintaining 
governments in areas of crisis.  
Given the conflation of stability operations with military 
objectives, one could potentially argue that there is no distinction 
between providing reconstruction or state-building assistance and 
pursuing a military objective. But key to this analysis is the 
requirement of “actual harm.” Under a more restrictive analysis, 
nothing that the CRC does would constitute direct participation in 
hostilities because nothing that the CRC does results in actual harm. 
All of its activities are designed to be reconstructive, as opposed to 
destructive. Rather than cause harm to personnel or materiel, the 
CRC’s focus is on the broad set of activities required to rebuild and 
help manage states.82 The CRC’s mission does not envision the 
commission of acts of force or violence against the enemy, nor 
would any of its activities directly link to some destructive 
consequence.83 Accordingly, pursuant to that restrictive view, 
civilian members of the CRC are not lawful targets under the law of 
armed conflict. 
B. STATUS OF THE CRC UNDER THE EXPANSIVE VIEW 
The analysis becomes more problematic when viewing the 
activities of the CRC under the more expansive view, to which the 
U.S. adheres. Using the “geographic, functional, and temporal ‘direct 
part’ determination” articulated by the U.S. DoD Law of War 
Working Group, the CRC members would likely retain their 
 
 80. U.S. Dep’t of State, Core Organizational Functions, 
http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c15213.htm (last visited May 31, 2010). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Wright, supra note 73 (describing the Corps’ role as taking charge of 
“entities including local police, courts, the banking system and airports after states 
collapse or governments are defeated”). 
 83. CRC, Mission Statement, http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
public.display&shortcut=4QXJ (last visited May 31, 2010) (stating that the CRC’s 
mission is aimed at “post-conflict situations,” transition, stabilization, and 
reconstruction). 
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protected status as civilians. While there may be geographic 
proximity of service, it would be difficult to characterize the CRC’s 
work as “provided to units in contact with the enemy.”84 Further, 
there would be little in the way of “proximity of relationship” 
between services provided and harm resulting to the enemy, given 
that most of the “services provided” would be reconstructive efforts 
not geared toward causing any destructive effect. Finally, because 
any link between the reconstructive work and a disadvantage to the 
enemy would be speculative at best, there would be no real temporal 
relationship between the support given by the CRC and the resultant 
harm to the enemy.85 Such a test would, therefore, yield the same 
result as the more restrictive ICRC approach.  
However, if we approach the CRC’s activities using a 
“functionality test,” which assesses the validity of the civilian target 
“based upon the importance and level of functions carried out by 
civilians on the battlefield,”86 then the status of civilian members of 
the CRC is far less clear given the previously discussed link of the 
CRC to the war effort. In addition, the importance of civilian 
personnel in counterinsurgency has been repeatedly and publicly 
described as essential to defeating insurgents such as the Taliban.87 
For instance, General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander of U.S. 
and NATO forces in Afghanistan, was unequivocal in a recent 
statement: 
[The International Security Assistance Force] cannot succeed 
without a corresponding cadre of civilian experts to support 
the change in strategy and capitalize on the expansion and 
acceleration of counterinsurgency efforts. Effective civilian 
capabilities and resourcing mechanisms are critical to 
 
 84. See Janin, supra note 36, at 89 (citing the DoD Law of War Working 
Group’s “direct part” test and its requirement that a civilian have geographic 
proximity to such units). 
 85. See id. (referencing the DoD Law of War Working Group’s requirement 
that there be a temporal relationship between the civilian’s services and actual 
harm to the enemy before that civilian’s immunity from attack is compromised). 
 86. Moore, supra note 31, at 21. 
 87. See, e.g., ISAF, supra note 9, at 2-21 (describing how effective civilian 
reconstruction efforts are necessary to support and capitalize on the 
counterinsurgency achievements); Weitz, supra note 53 (describing the new 
Obama administration’s strategy for winning the war in Afghanistan, which 
includes an increase in civilian personnel to “improve governance and rule of law 
throughout the country”). 
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achieving demonstrable progress. The relative level of 
civilian resources must be balanced with security forces, lest 
gains in security outpace civilian capacity for governance and 
economic improvements. In particular, ensuring alignment of 
resources for immediate and rapid expansion into newly 
secured areas will require integrated civil-military planning 
teams that establish mechanisms for rapid response.88  
The effort to defeat the enemy, therefore, necessarily relies, in 
General McChrystal’s assessment, on the presence of civilians who 
work alongside the military toward a common goal. It is important to 
underscore that the objective of the mission, to which General 
McChrystal refers, is to “disrupt,” “dismantle,” and ultimately 
“defeat” the enemies of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.89 In 
this effort, civilian and military goals are conjoined. The role of 
civilian reconstruction is thus inseparably linked to the enemy’s 
insuccess. 
According to an expansive “functionality” test, how does one 
classify a group of civilians who are funded through a war 
appropriations bill, receive training at a military base, expressly see 
U.S. national security as the impetus for their missions, and work 
alongside the military in conflict zones toward a common goal of 
vanquishing the enemy? Further, how does one classify such a group 
when its field of operation is considered a “core military mission” 
and top military commanders deem that group’s participation 
essential to secure the enemy’s submission?  
It seems that the functionality test allows targeting of the CRC 
under such circumstances. If, as with Afghan drug traffickers, mere 
facilitation and “direct participation” are considered coterminous, 
then civilians working to further a U.S. military objective cannot 
retain their protected status. The alignment of their purpose with the 
military goal, the critical role they play in the success of the military 
mission, and their “comingled” status (through funding, training, 
etc.) make them as much a target as any other facilitator or mission-
essential civilian in an armed conflict. As a result, if adherence to the 
functionality test is legitimate, targeting members of the CRC would 
likewise be legitimate. Accordingly, none of the desirable results of 
 
 88. ISAF, supra note 9, at 2-21. 
 89. Id. at 1-1. 
908 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:885 
prohibiting attacks on civilians would inure to the CRC’s benefit. For 
instance, those who target civilian members of the CRC would have 
a strong defense if tried before entities like the U.S. Military 
Commissions—at least if prosecuted for the crime of “intentionally 
engag[ing] in an attack upon a civilian population as such, or 
individual civilians not taking active part in hostilities.”90 
IV. MOVING THE CRC FROM BENEATH THE 
SHADOW OF BELLIGERENCE 
  As the discussion above demonstrates, the combined “grey 
zones” of stability operations and what constitutes “direct 
participation in hostilities” leave civilians in something of a 
quandary. The field of stability operations in which civilians work is 
now a core military mission—meaning success in their objective is 
coextensive with military success. Likewise, due to the lack of a 
formal, unified view of what constitutes “direct participation in 
hostilities,” myriad actors in the U.S. government have posited 
competing positions, some of which are strikingly broad and would 
serve to deprive civilians working in stability operations (including 
in the CRC) of their protected status under international law. So what 
can be done to resolve this conundrum and to move the CRC out of 
the shadow of belligerence and back into a clearly protected status?  
A. INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
DISENTANGLEMENT 
  It is tempting to seek to resolve this quandary at the 
institutional level and attempt to “dissipate the grey” by somehow 
disentangling stability operations, the role of the military, and the 
work of the CRC. For instance, funding for the CRC could instead 
come from a civilian source unassociated with armed conflict, rather 
than from the war supplementals, which now fund its operations. 
Likewise, its mission statement and the rhetoric of its directors could 
place less emphasis on national security and adopt a more 
humanitarian tone. But there does not seem to be much room beyond 
such superficial measures for meaningful disentanglement because 
the complex field of stability operations in areas of persistent conflict 
requires the intensive use of both military and civilian resources.  
 
 90. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. § 950t (2) (West 2009). 
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In that regard, the topic of the relative role of civilians and military 
personnel in stability operations has been a salient one in recent 
years. Specifically, the assumption of critical roles in U.S. foreign 
affairs by the military has been the subject of angst in some quarters 
and, within the parlance of this popular conversation,91 has been 
referred to as the “‘militarization’ of diplomacy.”92 Commentators 
have attributed this phenomenon to the lack of administrative 
capacity on the part of civilian agencies. A report by the American 
Academy of Diplomacy notes: 
[O]ur foreign affairs capacity is hobbled by a human capital 
crisis. We do not have enough people to meet our current 
responsibilities. Looking forward, requirements are 
expanding. Increased diplomatic needs in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and “the next” crisis area, as well as global challenges in 
finance, the environment, terrorism and other areas have not 
been supported by increased staffing. Those positions that do 
exist have vacancy rates approaching 15% at our Embassies 
and Consulates abroad and at the State Department in 
Washington, DC. USAID’s situation is even more dire. 
Today, significant portions of the nation’s foreign affairs 
business simply are not accomplished.93  
  Some of this current discussion has been critical of the 
increasing role of the military, arguing that the military lacks the 
expertise necessary for stability operations.94 But recent experience 
has demonstrated that the contractors frequently employed by 
civilian agencies, such as those employed by the Department of State 
to make up for its lack of organic capacity, lack the expertise or 
 
 91. See, e.g., Matt Armstrong, Pushing Humpty Dumpty: The Rebuilding of 
State, MOUNTAINRUNNER.US,  http://mountainrunner.us/2009/08/humpt_dumpty. 
html (Aug. 21, 2009, 12:03 EST) (questioning whether the militarization of U.S. 
diplomacy efforts is a positive development); Posting of Tony Carson to Carsons 
Post, http://carsonspost.wordpress.com/2007/11/07/us-militarization-of-diplomacy/ 
(Nov. 7, 2007) (examining the economic cost to the U.S. of the “militarization of 
diplomacy”). 
 92. AM. ACAD. OF DIPLOMACY, A FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET FOR THE FUTURE: 
FIXING THE CRISIS IN DIPLOMATIC READINESS 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. (asserting that the military lacks “sufficient experience [and] 
knowledge” to complete tasks that should be the responsibility of as-yet-
understaffed civilian agencies like the State Department). 
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training necessary for success in such endeavors. As one recent 
newspaper report noted, “[n]early two-thirds of the 276 Foreign 
Service members who volunteered to serve in Iraq next year were 
found unqualified for the jobs, aggravating a shortage that has left 
the State Department scrambling to fully staff its embassy and other 
operations in the country.”95 Likewise, in the face of potential 
deployments into Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of State 
endured a minor revolt among many of its members who refused to 
go to such conflict zones, creating serious staffing problems.96 
Moreover, after years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, civilian 
agencies still lack the administrative and logistical capacity to deploy 
into those areas.97 In September 2009, John Nagl, president of the 
Center for a New American Security, a Washington, D.C.-based 
defense think tank, opined: 
I think that quite simply there is not sufficient civilian 
capacity in the U.S. government to do what needs to be done. 
And we have not built that capacity. The civilian side still 
needs to develop some of the doctrine, some of the 
organization, some of the force structure that’s required to 
meet the demands.98 
One potential reason U.S. civilian agencies lack the relevant 
expertise and are not prepared—culturally or administratively—for 
such operations may lie in the fundamental nature of stability 
operations in areas of persistent conflict. Given the discussion above, 
it is worth considering whether the issue is not actually the 
militarization of diplomacy but, to the contrary, the civilianization of 
stability operations. Otherwise stated, it could be argued that the 
tasks associated with stability operations—a core mission of the U.S. 
military—are properly seen as so intrinsically military in nature, 
especially in the context of persistent conflict, that their function 
 
 95. Nicholas Kralev, Bidders Unready for Jobs in Iraq; Move Volunteers Seen 
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should necessarily be carried out by military personnel. According to 
such a view, the remittance of such tasks to the military was neither 
an unnatural event nor a shameful act of abandonment by the U.S. 
State Department, but the natural assumption by the military of tasks 
proper to its functional competence.  
In evaluating the issue through this prism, phenomena such as the 
inability of civilian agencies to staff positions in conflict zones, the 
lack of expertise on the part of the contractors hired to fill those 
positions, and the conclusion that conducting stability operations 
equates to “direct participation in hostilities” could be viewed as the 
predictable corollaries of a certain consistent logic. This logic 
revolves around the premise that stability operations in conflict zones 
are more military than civilian in nature. 
Such a view, however, is challenged by the urgency with which 
military commanders have pressed for greater civilian involvement.99 
Civilians now occupy an obviously important role in 
counterinsurgency and cannot be excluded from the equation without 
sacrificing a key resource that U.S. commanders desperately need. 
But if “there is not sufficient civilian capacity in the U.S. 
government to do what needs to be done,”100 and the military “cannot 
succeed without a corresponding cadre of civilian experts,”101 then 
there is little that can—or should—be done at the institutional level 
to unbundle this mass of government capabilities. The civil-military 
symbiosis that characterizes stability operations is appropriate and 
compelled by the complex nature of state-building and the sundry 
capabilities that must be brought to bear in order to attain success in 
such endeavors. Disentanglement is simply not an option. 
B . FORMALLY ABANDON THE FUNCTIONALITY TEST 
  If solutions to this quandary cannot be found at the 
institutional level, then another option that should be considered is 
the abandonment of the functionality test by the U.S. government 
and the formal adoption of a singular, alternate, and more restrictive 
interpretation of “direct participation in hostilities”—a position that 
 
 99. See ISAF, supra note 9, at 2-21 (arguing that success is not possible 
without civilian resources). 
 100. Northam, supra note 8. 
 101. ISAF, supra note 9, at 2-21. 
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applies throughout every part of government and crystallizes the U.S. 
position on the matter. This interpretation could be an approach to 
direct participation in hostilities that is more in line with the 
“Protocol I” approach.102 Alternatively, the U.S. government could 
formally and expressly adopt the DoD Law of War Working Group’s 
“geographic, functional, and temporal” test as the standard for all 
civilians across the board, supplanting the use of the functionality 
test and restoring a degree of ideological purity to the U.S. approach.  
While this test would certainly restrict the spectrum of potential 
targets, there would also be some advantages. For instance, the 
articulation of such an approach would serve to increase U.S. 
military interoperability with other nations that have ratified Protocol 
I or that have adopted similarly restrictive views. In addition, such a 
move would serve to reinforce the protections the United States 
wishes to preserve for its growing body of contractors and other 
civilians who accompany the U.S. military into conflict zones. 
Importantly, this test would also limit the ideological dissonance 
(and lack of clarity) in U.S. policy on this matter and enable a less 
Janus-faced approach. As one commentator has suggested: 
Just as it is in the United States’ interest to argue for a narrow 
interpretation of [direct participation in hostilities] in order to 
protect its civilians and contractors from attack, it is also in 
the United States’ interest to also argue for a broad 
interpretation of [direct participation in hostilities] in order to 
more easily justify the targeting and attacking of terrorists. It 
appears as if the United States is trying to have its cake and 
eat it, too.103 
Abandoning the functionality approach and formally articulating 
either a “Protocol I” approach or a “geographic, functional, and 
temporal” test would simultaneously bring an end to the current 
schizophrenic policy position, foster greater protection for U.S. 
civilians working in conflict zones, allow military commanders clear 
guidance on targeting civilians, and deprive terrorists and insurgents 
of defenses to their conduct when they target U.S. civilians. It would 
also put an end to the creeping prominence of the functionality 
approach, an approach which is too broad to serve as a legitimate 
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standard to safeguard civilians and far too malleable to legitimately 
uphold the principle of distinction under the law of international 
armed conflict.104 
CONCLUSION  
  Contemporary armed conflict is characterized as a seemingly 
dissonant combination of simultaneous reconstruction and 
destruction in order to eliminate those “who pose a threat to [a 
nation’s] foreign policy, security, or economic interests.”105 This 
paradigm necessarily entails a symbiotic relationship between 
civilians and the military—a relationship in which both entities lend 
various resources and expertise to a common mission in order to 
attain a common goal. In this grey area, which is neither fully 
civilian nor military in nature, actors operate under a legal 
framework in which their legal status is somewhat indeterminate. 
This is especially true for the CRC, a corps of government civilians 
whose mission is intimately linked with that of the U.S. military and 
national security concerns.  
  Another grey area exists in the varied U.S. approaches to 
interpreting “direct participation in hostilities.” While a more 
restrictive interpretation would preserve the privileged status and 
protections to which civilians (like those in the CRC) are entitled 
under international law, the more expansive views recently posited—
specifically the functionality approach—would serve to deprive them 
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of those protections. This combination of grey areas—the hybrid 
nature of stability operations and an unclear approach to targeting 
civilians—leaves entities like the CRC without definite protections 
and provides potential legal defenses to insurgents or terrorists who 
might otherwise be prosecuted for targeting civilians.  
  Abandoning the functionality approach would remedy the 
problems caused by this conceptual fog and strengthen the 
protections of U.S. civilians and the civilians of other nations 
working in zones of conflict. As Professor Dinstein has noted, 
“[p]recisely because of the desire to confer on civilians in wartime 
maximum protection, the international community must tenaciously 
oppose any and all attempts to devitalize the principle of 
distinction.”106 As a vibrant member of that community, and because 
of the many interests at stake, the United States should posit a clearly 
defined interpretation of “direct participation in hostilities,” which is 
broad enough to enable effective engagement of insurgents yet 
restrictive enough to uphold this cardinal principle. Acting otherwise 
will only further hinder civilian involvement in stability operations 
by leaving them to operate in the conceptual mire of two grey 
zones—the thickest grey. 
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